



INSTITUTE FOR LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND COMPUTATION

# Diversity, Agreement, and Polarization in Elections

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# The Problem

- Agreement has been disproportionally studied over diversity and polarisation.
- $A(E)$  has been characterised axiomatically.
- $1 - A(E)$  as a measure of disagreement (not diversity nor polarization).
- Polarisation creates a loss of diveristy.
- **Main goal:** *design election indices that distinguish these notions.*

- Defining diversity, agreement, and polarization (for ordinal elections).
- Finding diversity and polarization indices.
- The indices are based on the k-Kemeny problem.
- Computation of k-Kemeny distance.
- To evaluate the indices, *maps of elections* are used.

# Defining elections

- Election  $E = (C, V)$ .
- $p_E(a, b)$ : the fraction of voters in  $E$  that prefer  $a$  over  $b$ .
- Three characteristic elections:
  - **Identity (ID)**: all votes are identical: perfect agreement.
  - **Antagonism (AN)**: exactly half of the voters have one preference order; other half has the reversed one: perfect polarization.
  - **Uniformity (UN)**: contains the same number of copies of every possible preference order: perfect diversity.

# Kemeny Rankings and Swap Distance

- $\text{swap}(u, v)$ : swap distance, the minimal number of swaps of consecutive candidates required to transform  $u$  into  $v$ .
- **Kemeny ranking** of  $E = (C, V)$ : a linear order over  $C$  that minimizes the sum of its swap distances to the votes from  $V$ .
- $d\text{swap}(E, F)$ : the isomorphic swap distance between two elections  $E = (C, V)$  and  $F = (D, U)$ , s. t.  $|C| = |D|$ ,  $V = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$ , and  $U = (u_1, \dots, u_n)$ .

# Defining Maps of Elections

- **Map of elections:** a collection of elections represented on a 2D plane as points.
- The Euclidean distances between the points reflect the similarity between the elections.
- Maps created using isomorphic swap distance (the candidate sets considered are small).
- Compute the distance between each two elections, then run the multidimensional scaling algorithm (MDS) to find an embedding of points on a plane that reflects the computed distances.

# Defining diversity, agreement, and polarization

- **Election index:** a function that given an election outputs a real number.
- The **agreement index** of an election  $E = (C, V)$ :

$$A(E) = (\sum_{\{a,b\} \subseteq C} |p_E(a,b) - p_E(b,a)|) / \binom{|C|}{2}$$

- The index takes values between 0 and 1.
- 0 means perfect disagreement; 1 means perfect agreement.
- We have  $A(ID) = 1$  and  $A(UN) = A(AN) = 0$ .

# Diversity and Polarization Indices

- The diversity and polarization indices (main contribution).
- Defined on top of a generalization of the Kemeny ranking problem:  
 $k$ –Kemeny rankings of election  $E = (C, V)$  are the elements of a set  $\Lambda = \lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k$  of  $k$ –linear orders over  $C$  that minimize 
$$\sum \{v \in V\} \min_{i \in [k]} \text{swap}(v, \lambda_i).$$
- The  $k$ –Kemeny distance,  $k_k(E)$ , is equal to this minimum.
- Finding  $k$ –Kemeny rankings: finding an optimal split of votes into  $k$  groups; then minimizing the sum of each group's distance to its Kemeny ranking.
- 1–Kemeny distance: the distance of the voters from the (standard) Kemeny ranking.



# The diversity index

- **Desiderata:** diversity index high for UN, small for AN and ID.
- For ID, 1–Kemeny distance is equal to 0.
- For both UN and AN, 1–Kemeny distance is equal to the maximal possible value:  $|V| \cdot \binom{|C|}{2}/2$ .
- For  $k \geq 2$ , the  $k$ –Kemeny distance of AN is 0; in UN non-negligible positive distances arise.
- Then, the **diversity index** is a normalized sum of all  $k$ –Kemeny distances:

$$D(E) = (\sum_{k \in [|V|]} k_k(E)/k) / (|V| \cdot \binom{|C|}{2})$$

- Finding a more robust normalization is desirable: diversity of UN grows slightly faster than linearly with the growing number of candidates.

# The polarization index

- Strategy: look at AN and the drop from the maximal possible value of the 1–Kemeny distance to zero for the 2–Kemeny (characteristic of polarised elections).
- Divide by  $|V| \cdot \binom{|C|}{2}/2$  for normalisation; the index takes values between 0, for the lowest polarization, and 1.
- The **polarization index** of an election  $E = (C, V)$ :

$$P(E) = 2(k_1(E) - k_2(E)) / (|V| \cdot \binom{|C|}{2})$$

- $P(\text{AN})$  polarization is one, while for ID it is zero; with a growing number of candidates the polarization of UN approaches zero.

# $k$ -Kemeny is Hard to Compute

Decision variant of  $k$ -Kemeny is **NP-Complete**.

The problem is equivalent to the  $k$ -Median facility location problem:

- voters = clients
- $k$  central rankings =  $k$  facilities
- swap distance = distance metric

IDEA: Leverage efficient approximation algorithms for  $k$ -Median.


PROBLEM: Scales with the number of facilities, i.e., the  $m!$  possible preference rankings...

SOLUTION:  $k$ -Kemeny Among Votes; restrict search space to preference rankings that appear in the input.

## $k$ -Kemeny Among Votes

**Theorem.** *An  $\alpha$ -approximation for  $k$ -Kemeny Among Votes is a  $2\alpha$ -approximation for  $k$ -Kemeny.*

*Proof.*



# $k$ -Kemeny Among Votes is NP-Complete

## Max K-cover (NP-hard)

- Universe  $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_N\}$ , and subsets  $\mathcal{S} = \{S_1, \dots, S_M\}$
- Goal: Pick  $K \leq M$  subsets to maximize coverage

## Reduction to $k$ -Kemeny Among Votes

- Set Voters: Many copies of  $v_j$  per set  $S_j$  + preferences
- Element Voters: One  $e_i$  per element  $x_i$  + preferences

$$\text{swap}(e_i, v_j) = \begin{cases} 3 & \text{if } x_i \in S_j \\ 3 + C & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


## Equivalences

Pick $k$ central rankings	$\iff$	Pick $K$ sets
Element close to center	$\iff$	Element covered
Minimize total distance	$\iff$	Maximize coverage

## *k*-Kemeny Among Votes Approximations


Algorithm	Approximation Ratio
Greedy	?
Local search	$6 + \frac{4}{p}$
Combined heuristic	$6 + \frac{4}{p}$

# Understanding the Map of Elections



**Figure 1:** Map of elections (left), and plot where coordinates are agreement and diversity (right).

# Understanding the Map of Elections



**Figure 2:** Correlation coefficients below  $-0.9$ .



- $1 - A_E$  captures neither diversity nor polarization, but disagreement.
- (something on compass elections?)
- (something on diversity/polarization indices?) ...  $k$ -Kemeny unites all three indices.
- Maps of elections can be understood in terms of Agreement, Diversity, and Polarization.