

# Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences

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Based on a joint work with *Dominik Peters*


# Reminder: Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)

Voters provide  
a **ranking** of the candidates



1	E
2	D
3	B
4	A
5	C

The score of each candidate is  
**their number of 1<sup>st</sup> place**




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The candidate with the lowest score is **eliminated**, and their votes are transferred


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
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
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
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
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
The score of each candidate is  
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
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# Reminder: Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)

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And so on, until one candidate remains

# Reminder: Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)


**Ireland** (since 1937)



**Australia** (since 1918)



**Fiji** (since 1999)




**Alaska, USA** (since 2022)



**Maine, USA** (since 2018)



**Hong Kong** (since 1998)



Also used for **primaries** in some countries



# Properties of IRV

- ✓ **Independence of clones:** adding/removing a clone of a candidate does not change the results of the election.
- ✓ **Majority criterion:** if a majority of voters rank one candidate first, this candidate should win.
- ✗ **Monotonicity:** if a candidate is the winner and we improve its rank in some rankings, it should remain the winner.

# Allowing for Indifferences

What if a voter is **indifferent** between several candidates?



1	E
	D
2	B
	A
3	C

CITY AND COUNTY 市長		1	2	3	4	5	6
MAYOR 市長		1st Choice 第一選擇	2nd Choice 第二選擇	3rd Choice 第三選擇	4th Choice 第四選擇	5th Choice 第五選擇	6th Choice 第六選擇
WILMA PANG / 彭瀟麗 Retired Music Professor 退休音樂教授		●	2	3	4	5	6
ROBERT L. JORDAN, JR. / 小羅伯特·L·喬丹 Preacher 傳教士		1	●	3	4	5	6
PAUL YBARRA ROBERTSON / 保羅·伊巴拉·羅伯森 Small Business Owner 小企業家主		1	●	3	4	5	6
ELLEN LEE ZHOU / 李愛晨 Behavioral Health Clinician 行為健康臨床治療師		1	2	3	4	5	6
LONDON N. BREED / 洛敦·布里德 Mayor of San Francisco 三藩市市長		●	2	3	4	5	6
JOEL VENTRESCA / 茱爾·范崔斯卡 Retired Airport Analyst 退休機場分析師		1	2	●	4	5	6
		1	2	3	4	5	6

**Fig.** A ballot cast in San Francisco mayor election, containing indifferences



Voters can cast **weak orders**

**Question:**  
**How to generalize Instant Runoff Voting  
to weak orders?**

# Outline of the talk

## Part 1.

### The different solutions

## Part 2.

### Axiomatic analysis

## Part 3.

### Experimental analysis

This talk is based on a paper published at **EC' 2024**,  
which is a joint work with  
*Dominik Peters, Paris-Dauphine University.*

#### Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences

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DOMINIK PETERS, CNRS, LMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine - PSL, France

Manuscript: April 2024

Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as a ranking. We identify a generalization of the rule, called Approval-IRV, that allows voters more freedom by allowing them to give equal preference to several candidates. Such weak orders are a more expressive input format than linear orders, and they help reduce the cognitive effort of voting.

Just like standard IRV, Approval-IRV proceeds in rounds by successively eliminating candidates. It interprets each vote as an approval vote for its most-preferred candidates among those that have not been eliminated. At each step, it eliminates the candidate who is approved by the fewest voters. Among the large class of scoring elimination rules, we prove that Approval-IRV is the unique way of extending IRV to weak orders that preserves its characteristic axiomatic properties, in particular independence of clones and respecting a majority's top choices. We also show that Approval-IRV is the unique extension of IRV among rules in this class that satisfies a natural monotonicity property defined for weak orders.

Prior work has proposed a different generalization of IRV, which we call Split-IRV, where instead of approving, each vote is interpreted as splitting 1 point equally among its top choices (for example, 0.25 points each if a vote has 4 top choices), and then eliminating the candidate with the lowest score. Split-IRV fails independence of clones, may not respect majority wishes, and fails our monotonicity condition.

The multi-winner version of IRV is known as Single Transferable Vote (STV). We prove that Approval-STV continues to satisfy the strong proportional representation properties of STV, underlining that the approval way is the right way of extending the IRV/STV idea to weak orders.

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# **Part 1**

## **Generalizations of IRV with indifferences**

# Model and notations

We have a set of **voters**  $V = \{1, \dots, n\}$  and of **candidates**  $C = \{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$ .

A **weak order**  $\geqslant$  is a complete pre-order (reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation) over the set of candidates  $C$ .

We denote  $\geqslant = C_1 \succ C_2 \succ \dots \succ C_k$  with  $C_j \subseteq C$ . We call the  $C_j$  the **indifference classes** of  $\geqslant$  and  $\tau_{\geqslant} = (|C_1|, \dots, |C_k|)$  its **order type**.

A **preference profile** is a collection of weak orders  $P = (\geqslant_1, \dots, \geqslant_n)$ .

A **voting rule** is a function that associates each profile to one or (in case of ties) several winning candidates.

# Example

## Preferences

$\{A, B\} \succ \{C\} \succ \{D\}$

$\{A, B, D\} \succ \{C\}$

$\{B\} \succ \{A, C\} \succ \{D\}$

$\{C\} \succ \{A\} \succ \{B, D\}$

$\{D\} \succ \{A\} \succ \{B\} \succ \{C\}$

## Order type

$(2, 1, 1)$

$(3, 1)$

$(1, 2, 1)$

$(1, 1, 2)$

$(1, 1, 1, 1)$

# How to design generalization?

We want to keep the idea of **repeatedly eliminating a candidate with the lowest score**, with score being computed at each step by looking at the **top indifference class** of every order.

**Question:** how should the score be computed?

$$\{A, B\} > \{C\} > \{D\}$$

$$\{A, B, D\} > \{C\}$$

$$\{B\} > \{A, C\} > \{D\}$$

$$\{C\} > \{A\} > \{B, D\}$$

$$\{D\} > \{A\} > \{B\} > \{C\}$$

# Rule 1: Split-IRV

**Split-IRV** (Meek and Hill, 1994)

Each voter gives  $1/k$  point to the  $k$  candidates that are tied as first among the remaining candidates in their ranking.



# Rule 1: Split-IRV

**Split-IRV** (Meek and Hill, 1994)

Each voter gives  $1/k$  point to the  $k$  candidates that are tied as first among the remaining candidates in their ranking.

**Equivalent definition:** if a weak order admit  $\ell$  possible completions into a full ranking, replace every weak order by all its possible completions each with weight  $1/\ell$  and compute the winner.

1	E
	D
2	B
	A
3	C



1	E	1	D
2	D	2	E
3	B	3	B
4	A	4	A
5	C	5	C


  

1	E	1	D
2	D	2	E
3	A	3	A
4	B	4	B
5	C	5	C

# Rule 2: Approval-IRV

Approval-IRV (*Janson, 2016*)

Each voter gives 1 point to the  $k$  candidates that are tied as first among the remaining candidates in their ranking.



# Example

$\{A, B\} > \{C\} > \{D\}$

Approval-IRV

Split-IRV

$\{A, B, D\} > \{C\}$

4<sup>th</sup>

$\{B\} > \{A, C\} > \{D\}$

3<sup>rd</sup>

$\{C\} > \{A\} > \{B, D\}$

2<sup>nd</sup>

$\{D\} > \{A\} > \{B\} > \{C\}$

1<sup>st</sup>

$A:$

$B:$

$C:$

$D:$

# Example

$\{A, B\} > \{C\} > \{D\}$

Approval-IRV

Split-IRV

$\{A, B, D\} > \{C\}$

4<sup>th</sup>

$\{B\} > \{A, C\} > \{D\}$

3<sup>rd</sup>

$\{C\} > \{A\} > \{B, D\}$

2<sup>nd</sup>

$\{D\} > \{A\} > \{B\} > \{C\}$

1<sup>st</sup>

$A: 2$

$B: 3$

$C: 1$

$D: 2$

# Example

$\{A, B\} > \{D\}$

$\{A, B, D\}$

$\{B\} > \{A\} > \{D\}$

$\{A\} > \{B, D\}$

$\{D\} > \{A\} > \{B\}$

$A: 3$

$B: 3$

$C: 0$

$D: 2$

Approval-IRV

4<sup>th</sup>

$C$

3<sup>rd</sup>

2<sup>nd</sup>

1<sup>st</sup>

# Example

$\{A, B\}$

$\{A, B\}$

$\{B\} > \{A\}$

$\{A\} > \{B\}$

$\{A\} > \{B\}$

$A: 4$

$B: 3$

Approval-IRV

4<sup>th</sup>

$C$

3<sup>rd</sup>

$D$

2<sup>nd</sup>

1<sup>st</sup>

Split-IRV

$D: 0$

# Example

	Approval-IRV	Split-IRV
$\{A, B\}$		
$\{A, B\}$	4 <sup>th</sup>	$C$
$\{B\} > \{A\}$	3 <sup>rd</sup>	$D$
$\{A\} > \{B\}$	2 <sup>nd</sup>	$B$
$\{A\} > \{B\}$	1 <sup>st</sup>	$A$
$A: 4$	$C: 0$	$D: 0$
$B: 3$		

# Example

$\{A, B\} > \{C\} > \{D\}$

Approval-IRV

Split-IRV

$\{A, B, D\} > \{C\}$

4<sup>th</sup>

$C$

$\{B\} > \{A, C\} > \{D\}$

3<sup>rd</sup>

$D$

$\{C\} > \{A\} > \{B, D\}$

2<sup>nd</sup>

$B$

$\{D\} > \{A\} > \{B\} > \{C\}$

1<sup>st</sup>

$A$

$A: 1/2 + 1/3$

$B: 1/2 + 1/3 + 1$

$C: 1$

$D: 1/3 + 1$

# Example

$\{B\} > \{C\} > \{D\}$

$\{B, D\} > \{C\}$

$\{B\} > \{C\} > \{D\}$

$\{C\} > \{B, D\}$

$\{D\} > \{B\} > \{C\}$

$A: 0$

$B: 1 + 1/2 + 1$

$C: 1$

$D: 1/2 + 1$

Approval-IRV

4<sup>th</sup>

$C$

3<sup>rd</sup>

$D$

2<sup>nd</sup>

$B$

1<sup>st</sup>

$A$

Split-IRV

$A$

# Example

$\{B\} \succ \{D\}$

$\{B, D\}$

$\{B\} \succ \{D\}$

$\{B, D\}$

$\{D\} \succ \{B\}$

$A: 0$

$B: 3$

$C: 0$

$D: 2$

Approval-IRV

4<sup>th</sup>

$C$

3<sup>rd</sup>

$D$

2<sup>nd</sup>

$B$

1<sup>st</sup>

$A$

Split-IRV

$A$

$C$

# Example

$\{B\} \succ \{D\}$

$\{B, D\}$

$\{B\} \succ \{D\}$

$\{B, D\}$

$\{D\} \succ \{B\}$

$A: 0$

$B: 3$

$C: 0$

$D: 2$

Approval-IRV

4<sup>th</sup>

$C$

3<sup>rd</sup>

$D$

2<sup>nd</sup>

$B$

1<sup>st</sup>

$A$

Split-IRV

$A$

$C$

$D$

$B$

# The family of runoff scoring rules

A **scoring system** is a function  $s$  that associates each order type  $\tau$  to a scoring vector of the same length  $s(\tau) = (s(\tau)_1, \dots, s(\tau)_{|\tau|})$ . Given a weak order  $\geq = C_1 \succ C_2 \succ \dots \succ C_k$  of order type  $\tau$ , **candidates in indifference class  $C_j$  receive  $s(\tau)_j$  points**.

A **runoff scoring rule** based on the scoring system  $s$  works by step and at each step it eliminates the candidate with the lowest score.

**Approval-IRV** is based on the scoring system such that  $s(\tau) = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$  for all order types  $\tau$ .

**Split-IRV** is based on the scoring system such that  $s(\tau) = (1/\tau_1, 0, \dots, 0)$  for all order types  $\tau$ .

# **Part 2**

## **An axiomatic comparison**

# Axiom 1: Independence of Clones

Independence of clones (Tideman, 1987)

Adding a “clone” of a candidate should not change significantly the result of the election.

$$\{A, B\} > \{\textcolor{red}{C}\} > \{\textcolor{red}{C}'\}$$



$$\{A\} > \{\textcolor{red}{C}, \textcolor{red}{C}'\} > \{B\}$$

$$\{B, \textcolor{red}{C}, \textcolor{red}{C}'\} > \{A\}$$

$$\{\textcolor{red}{C}\} > \{\textcolor{red}{C}'\} > \{B\} > \{A\}$$

The rule returns the same candidates in these two profiles



$$\{A, B\} > \{\textcolor{red}{C}\}$$

$$\{A\} > \{\textcolor{red}{C}\} > \{B\}$$

$$\{B, \textcolor{red}{C}\} > \{A\}$$

$$\{\textcolor{red}{C}\} > \{B\} > \{A\}$$

# Axiom 1: Independence of Clones

Independence of clones (*Tideman, 1987*)

Adding a “clone” of a candidate should not change significantly the result of the election.

- ✓ When we restrict the profile to **full rankings**, **IRV** satisfies this axiom.
- ✓ **Approval-IRV** satisfies this axiom.
- ✗ **Split-IRV** fails this axiom.

# Axiom 2: Respect for Cohesive Majorities

Majority Criterion (*Lepelley, 1992*)

If a majority of voters rank one candidate first, this candidate should be the winner.

- ✓ When we restrict the profile to **full rankings**, **IRV** satisfies this axiom.
- ✗ This axiom is **too strong** for the weak order case (and not desirable).

# Axiom 2: Respect for Cohesive Majorities

## Respect for cohesive majorities

If a majority of voters rank one candidate first, **the winner should be ranked first by one of these voters.**

- ✓ When we restrict the profile to **full rankings**, **IRV** satisfies this axiom.
- ✓ **Approval-IRV** satisfies this axiom.
- ✗ **Split-IRV** fails this axiom.

# Characterization (1) of Approval-IRV

## First characterization of Approval-IRV

Approval-IRV is the **only** runoff scoring rule for weak orders that satisfies **both** independence of clones and respect for cohesive majorities.

# Axiom 3: Indifference Monotonicity

Monotonicity (*Fishburn, 1982*)

If some candidate is the winner, and we increase the rank of this candidate in one ranking, it should still win.

✗ IRV fails  
monotonicity

1	Eddy
2	Dan
3	Bob
4	Ann
5	Cora

**Bob** wins



1	Eddy
2	Bob
3	Dan
4	Ann
5	Cora

**Bob** still wins

# Axiom 3: Indifference Monotonicity

## Weak monotonicity

If some candidate is the winner, and we increase the rank of this candidate in one ranking **in which this candidate is not tied**, it should still win.

-  Split-IRV
-  Approval-IRV

1	Eddy
	Dan
2	Bob
3	Ann
	Cora

**Bob** wins



1	Eddy
	Dan
2	Bob
2	Ann
	Cora

**Bob** still wins

# Characterization (2) of Approval-IRV

## Second characterization of Approval-IRV

Approval-IRV is the **only** runoff scoring rule for weak orders that generalizes IRV and satisfies weak monotonicity

# **Part 3**

## **Experimental analysis**

# What experiments to run?

- 1 **Generate** preference profiles.
- 2 **Compute** the Approval-IRV and Split-IRV winners.
- 3 **Analyze** the results:
  - How similar are the two rules in practice?
  - How similar are these rules to known SCF?
  - Which rule return the “best” winner?

# Generating datasets

**Step 1:** Generate full rankings

**How?**

**Step 2:** Introduce indifferences

**How?**

# Generating datasets

**Step 1:** Generate full rankings

**How?**

- **Synthetic data:**  
Probabilistic models
- **Real data**

**Step 2:** Introduce indifferences

**How?**

# Synthetic data: The impartial culture (IC)

In the **Impartial Culture (IC) model**, every possible ranking has the same probability to be sampled i.i.d. for each voter:

$$P(\succ_i = \succ) = \frac{1}{m!} \quad \text{For all ranking } \succ \in L(A) \text{ and all voter } i \in V.$$

**Remark:** IC is very simplistic and unrealistic so it should not be the only model used, but it is a frequently used model, so it serves as a baseline.

# Synthetic data: Mallows' model

In a **Mallows' model**, all rankings are noisy approximations of a ground truth ranking. More formally, there exists a **central ranking**  $\succ^*$  such that it is more likely to sample rankings closer to  $\succ^*$ . The distance between rankings is computed with the **Kendall-tau distance**:

$$d_{KT}(\succ_1, \succ_2) = |\{x, y \in C : x \succ_1 y \text{ and } y \succ_2 x\}|$$

**Example:** The KT distance between  $a \succ_1 b \succ_1 c \succ_1 d$  and  $c \succ_2 b \succ_2 a \succ_2 d$  is 3 because the rankings are disagreeing on 3 pairs of candidates.

# Synthetic data: Mallows' model

Then, we sample rankings based on the central ranking  $\succ^*$  and a **dispersion parameter**  $\phi \in [0,1]$ :

$$P(\succ_i = \succ \mid \succ^*, \phi) = \frac{\phi^{d_{KT}(\succ, \succ^*)}}{K} \quad \text{with } K \text{ a normalization constant.}$$


**Question:** what happens when  $\phi = 0$ ? And when  $\phi = 1$ ?

# Mixture of Mallows

In a **mixture of  $k$  Mallows**, there are  $k$  central rankings  $(\succ_1^*, \dots, \succ_k^*)$  and probabilities  $(p_1, \dots, p_k)$  with  $\sum p_j = 1$ . For each voter, we select one Mallows according to the probabilities  $(p_j)_j$  and we draw a random ranking according to the Mallows model with central ranking  $\succ_j^*$  and dispersion  $\phi$ .


This enables to have **more diversity** in the preferences.

# Synthetic data: Euclidean Preferences




»» Positions of voters and candidates are sampled randomly in the space.

# Synthetic data: Euclidean Preferences



»» Voters prefer candidates that are closer to them:




# Synthetic data: Euclidean Preferences




Voters



Candidates




»» We can also obtain weak orders:



# Synthetic data: The map of elections

- Preference profiles sampled from **various probabilistic models**.
- Similar profiles appear **close to each other** on the map of elections.




**Figure.** Map of elections with the isomorphic swap distance. Picture from *Boehmer et al. (2022b)*

# Real data: Preflib.org

- Preference profiles from **real-world** elections.
- Also contains **tools** for computational social choice.

We take the **Irish** dataset from Preflib.




The screenshot shows the homepage of PrefLib.org. The header is dark blue with the title "PrefLib: A Library for Preferences" in white. Below the header is a navigation bar with four tabs: "Format", "Datasets" (which is the active tab, highlighted in white), "Collections", and "Search". The main content area has a light blue background. The first section is titled "PrefLib" in bold blue text. It contains a paragraph about PrefLib being a reference library of preference data maintained by *Nicholas Mattei* and *Simon Rey*, with the original version developed by *Nicholas Mattei* and *Toby Walsh*. Below this is another paragraph about the aims of PrefLib, mentioning computational social choice, recommender systems, data mining, machine learning, and combinatorial optimization. The second section is titled "PrefLib-Tools" in bold blue text. It describes the strength of PrefLib in providing curated data in a unified format, encouraging users to read detailed explanations and explore datasets. To the right of the main content, there are two sidebar sections: "In Brief" and "Other Links". "In Brief" lists statistics: 72 datasets, 15305 data files, and more than 2.85 GB of data. "Other Links" lists external resources: DEMOCRATIX, Pnyx, and Aggregation Tool.

Screenshot from [preflib.org](http://preflib.org)

# Real data: *Voter Autrement*

- Preference profiles from **voting experiments** in parallel to large-scale political elections.



The screenshot shows the homepage of The Voting Experiments Library. The main title is "The Voting Experiments Library" with an "ALPHA" badge. Below it is a subtitle: "A collection of datasets of voting experiments for research, teaching or dissemination purposes." On the left, there is a sidebar with "Filters" and three sections: "Experiments types" (In situ, Online), "Preference formats" (Appreciations, Approval, Continuous, Pairwise, Rankings, Scores, Top-4 rankings), and "Voting rules" (Approval Voting). On the right, the "Voter Autrement 2022 - Online Experiment" dataset is displayed. It includes a "2022" badge, "Country: France", "Type: Online", "Candidates: 12", and "Participants: 2308". A description states: "This dataset contains data from an online voting experiment conducted in April 2022 during the French presidential election. In this experiment, participants were asked to test several alternative voting methods to elect the French president, like scoring methods, instant-runoff voting, Borda with partial rankings, majority judgement and pairwise comparisons." Below the description are several buttons representing different voting methods: Approval, Scores, Continuous, Appreciations, Pairwise, Rankings, Top-4 rankings, Approval Voting, Evaluative Voting, Majority Judgement, IRV, Borda-4, and Condorcet. At the bottom, there is a "Reference to Cite" section with a "B" icon, the dataset name, the authors "Théo Delemazure, Sylvain Bouveret (2024)", and a "Reference link".

Screenshot from [theo.delemazure.fr/datasets/](http://theo.delemazure.fr/datasets/)

# Real data: Collect your own dataset

- If you want a very **specific preference format** or data type, you can run your own experiments.
- You can either **build a website** (with helps of LLM) or use simple tools such as Google form or [pref.tools/vote/](https://pref.tools/vote/)
- You can **share it to friends or on social media** (but it will not yield a representative sample).

# From rankings to weak orders

Given a full ranking and a parameter  $p \in [0,1]$ , we consider each pair of successive candidates in the ranking and **add a tie between them with probability  $p$ .**

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} A & \succ & B & \succ & C & \succ & D & \succ & E \\ & p & & p & & p & & p \end{array}$$

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$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} A & \sim & B & \succ & C & \succ & D \sim E \\ & p & & p & & p & p \\ & & & & & & \downarrow \\ & & & & & & \\ \{A, B\} & \succ & C & \succ & \{D, E\} & & \end{array}$$


# Experiment settings

For each dataset, average over **10 000 sampled profiles**.

Profiles of  $n = 500$  voters and  $m = 10$  candidates.


**Indifference parameters**  $p$  and  $r$  varying between 0 (full rankings) and 1 (complete indifference).

# Results: Similarities between rules




**Figure.** Frequency of agreement between Approval-IRV and Split-IRV on our datasets (depending on the value of the indifference parameter  $p$  or  $r$ ).

# Results: Similarities with classical SCF




**Figure.** Frequency of agreement between the rules and **linear-order IRV** (based on full rankings) on our datasets. (depending on the value of the indifference parameter  $p$  or  $r$ ).

# Results: Similarities with classical SCF



**Figure.** Frequency of finding the Condorcet winner, and frequency of such candidate existing on our datasets. (depending on the value of the indifference parameter  $p$  or  $r$ ).


# Results: Similarities with classical SCF




**Figure.** Average Borda score of the winner (normalized by dividing by the number of voters) on our datasets. (depending on the value of the indifference parameter  $p$  or  $r$ ).

# Results: Similarities with classical SCF


**Figure.** Map of elections, showing the difference in Borda score between the Approval-IRV and Split-IRV winners in the coin-flip model, with blue dots indicating that Approval-IRV selected on average a winner with higher Borda score.



# Results: Utilitarian perspective




# Results: Utilitarian perspective



- »» The **cost** of a candidate is the sum of its distance to all the voters.
- »» The **lower the cost, the better**

# Results: Utilitarian perspective

**Figure.** The frequency of returning the candidate with the lowest cost for each rule.



# Conclusion

# Conclusion

Approval-IRV is the only rule that satisfies the generalization in the weak order setting of **desirable axioms satisfied by IRV**.

Approval-IRV is the only generalization of IRV to the weak order setting that **satisfies a weak monotonicity property**.

**Empirically**, Split-IRV will return the IRV winner more often while Approval-IRV will look for a more consensual candidate (because of its “approval” part).

In the Euclidean setting, Approval-IRV **often return better winners** than Split-IRV from a utilitarian perspective.

**Also in the paper:** Generalization of STV, the multi-winner versions of IRV.

# Thanks for your attention!