# How to derive the axis of candidates from approval ballots? 

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## Who am I?

- Second year PhD student under the supervision of Jerome Lang and Dominik Peters.
- Formation: ENS (2017-2021) and Master IASD (2019-2020).


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- Formation: ENS (2017-2021) and Master IASD (2019-2020).
- Disclaimer: Have not been doing much machine learning since then.


## What do I do?

I chose to focus on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC). And mostly voting theory.

## My tools:

- Axiomatic analysis: does this voting rule satisfies this particular property?
- Computational complexity: how hard is it to compute the results of this problem? How hard is it to manipulate?
- Data simulation: if I generate voting data with some model, which rule performs the best for some metrics?
- Data analysis: what would be the results of this rule on this real dataset?


## What do I do?

It would be interesting to mix this with machine learning ideas:

- Rules that use machine learning techniques to aggregate preferences, or for other social choice problems (e.g. matching).
- Using ML to evaluate the rules.
- Learning to vote: bandit/reinforcement learning to simulate behavior of voters.
- Using preference aggregation knowledge for classifiers aggregation/ensemble learning.


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Let's see this on an example!

## Voter Autrement



Les résultats 2022 sont désormais en ligne

```
|||\MC
La page de résultats
```

Vous pouvez cependant toujour tester les modes de scrutin en participant à l'expérimentation
Présidentielle 2022
Présidentielle 2017
Merci aux 2659 personnes qui ont déjà participé à l'expérimentation !

Website of the experiment Voter Autrement 2022

## Voter Autrement



Prequel of this presentation

## Approval ballots

## Approval ballot

Candidate $1 \square$
Candidate $2 \quad \square$
Candidate 3
Candidate $4 \square$
Candidate $5 \quad \square$
Candidate $6 \quad \square$

Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français by Isabelle Lebon, Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, Jean-François Laslier

They use the approval ballots of the experiment in 2012 to compute the most likely left-right axis and how much it fits the data.

What is the best way to obtain a left-right axis of the candidates from the approval ballots?

How to qualitatively evaluate if a set of candidates can be represented by an axis?

## Example

Let's say we have the following profile:

|  | $\mid$ Sarkozy | Hollande | Joly | Melenchon | Le Pen | Bayrou |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $v_{1}$ | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ |
| $v_{2}$ | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| $v_{3}$ |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |  |
| $v_{4}$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ |
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The profile is not linear anymore.

## Some rules

We select the axis that minimize some distance:

- Voter Deletion (VD): how many voters do we need to delete to make the profile linear with the axis?


## Example

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Le Pen |  |  |  |  |  |
| $v_{1}$ |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |
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We need to add 2 candidates to the approval ballots.

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- Voter Deletion (VD): how many voter do we need to delete to make the profile linear with the axis?
- Ballot Completion (BC): how many candidates do we need to add to approval ballots to make the profile linear with the axis?
- Minimal Flips (MF), Minimal Swaps (MS) and Forbidden Triplets (FT).


## Which one to chose?

1. Computational complexity: how hard is it to compute the best axis?
2. Data analysis on real dataset: what do we observe on real data?
3. Experiments and simulations: which rule perform the best on simulated data?
4. Axiomatic analysis: what are the theorethical properties of the rules?

## 1. Computational complexity

- Direct reductions to already known NP-Hard problems.
- Brute-force algorithm: how to optimize it? (1 month $\rightarrow 1$ hour).
- Integer Linear Program

Time to compute the axis for different number of candidates ( $\mathrm{n}=1000$ )


## 2. Analysis on real datasets

French presidential elections from 2002 to 2022 , and other political elections (below: France 2017, ~ 10, 000 voters).

Voter Deletion: FA $\prec$ MLP $\prec$ NDA $\prec \mathrm{FF} \prec \mathrm{EM} \prec \mathrm{BH} \prec \mathrm{JLM} \prec \mathrm{PP} \prec \mathrm{NA} \prec \mathrm{JL} \prec \mathrm{JC}$
Ballot Completion: MLP $\prec \mathrm{NDA} \prec \mathrm{FF} \prec \mathrm{JL} \prec \mathrm{EM} \prec \mathrm{BH} \prec \mathrm{JLM} \prec \mathrm{PP} \prec \mathrm{NA} \prec \mathrm{FA} \prec \mathrm{JC}$
$73 \%$ of votes are intervals ( $69 \%$ if we exclude votes with 1 candidate), and $\sim 0.7$ candidates to add per voter for Ballot Completion (excluding votes with 1 candidate).

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Small candidates seem pushed towards the extremes.

## 2. Analysis on real datasets

Position 0 on left-right axis
Position 1 on left-right axis
Position 2 on left-right axis







## 2. Analysis on real datasets

Position 5 on left-right axis
Position 6 on left-right axis
Position 7 on left-right axis







## 2. Analysis on real datasets

Sushi dataset of rankings, we can vary the number of approved candidates.


## 2. Analysis on real datasets

oiliness score


## 2. Analysis on real datasets

Approval score


## 3. Simulations on synthetic data

- We need a model to generate synthetic approval data with an underlying axis.
- We also want to have "big" and "small" candidates.
- Proposal:

1. Voters and candidates have a positions $x \in[0,1]$ and candidates also have a fame score $s_{c} \in[0,1]$.
2. Voters have a higher chance to approve candidates that are close to them, and that are famous.

## 3. Simulations on synthetic data

## Experiments

- Which rule find the correct axis most of the time? How does it depends on the parameters of the model?
- Which rule is the less sensitive to the eccentricity issue?
- Which rule is the most robust to slight variations of the profile?
- How do the rules compare to MLE?


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- Neutrality, Continuity, Clone-proofness, Heredity, Stability,...


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- Characterize specific rules (Voter Deletion: Anonymity + Neutrality + Reinforcement + Continuity + Stability + Linear-consistency).


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-     + Stability: $\operatorname{score}\left(A_{v}, \prec\right) \in\{0,1\}$.
- Characterize specific rules (Voter Deletion: Anonymity + Neutrality + Reinforcement + Continuity + Stability + Linear-consistency).
- Highlights impossibilities: Linear-consistency + Indifference to unknown candidates.


## 4. Axiomatic analysis

- Linear-consistency: if a profile is a linear (i.e. all votes are interval of some axis), the output should be all the axis consistent with the profile.
- Indifference to unknown candidates: if nobody approve a candidate, its position is interchangeable in the output axis.

Example: 3 candidates $\{a, b, c\}$ and 1 voter $\{a, b\} . c$ is never approved but there is no reason to put it between $a$ and $b$.

## 4. Axiomatic analysis

## There are two ways out of this issue:

1. A feature, not a bug: if nobody like some candidate, it makes sense that it is put at an extremity.
2. Finer model: instead of a simple ordering, we could have something like a fuzzy relation, or only output a subset of the candidates. We could also output positions on a metric space.

## From orders to metric space

What if, instead of a an axis, we want to output more information, for instance the positions of all candidates on a 1D (or 2D) metric space?
$\Rightarrow$ Dimension reduction.

I tried with the dimension reduction algorithms I know: PCA, TSNE, Isomap, MDS. Results are bad: the resulting axis do not make any sense, and some of them are not deterministic.

## Conclusion

- Can we use machine learning techniques to find interesting way to solve this problem?
- Can this problem be useful in machine learning ? (applied to a group of classifiers for instance?)


## Thanks for your attention!

